Transcript 911-Commission (2nd Hearing) -Pt.2

For technical reasons, Pt.2 appears first. Please start at Pt.1, in case you haven't read it yet

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

It's my understanding and firm belief that the Federal Aviation Administration would immediately notify us at the first sign of any impropriety in any aircraft, whether it's commercial, cargo or civilian. We would immediately take action to get our fighters airborne from the nearest suitable location. And we have that location set now where we didn't have it prior to the 11th. We should be able to protect our critical infrastructure, our major population centers. But there is, as in any case in the military effort, there are some risks but we are postured to accept that responsibility. So the example you gave us out of Boston is the F- 15s out of Otis would be immediately scrambled, they would immediately intercept the aircraft and we would stand by for further authorities from those above us.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

I would just point out that if the question were if it happened today. You have airborne interceptors that would be vectored into those aircraft, to intercept.

Thomas Kean, Chairman

Commissioner Hamilton

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair

I just want to clarify a few things after listening to all this testimony; it's not all that clear to me. As of September 11th, only the President had the authority to order a shoot down of a commercial aircraft?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

That's correct, Sir.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair

And today, who has the authority?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

We see the President, delegated to the Secretary of Defense, delegated to the Combatant Commander of Northern Command and the North American Airspace Command and there are emergency authorities if that fails.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair

So you have authority.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

Yes sir and others.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair

And how many others?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

I'd prefer not to say in this forum sir, but I can provide it for the record.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair

And you do not have to go up the chain of command at all in the event of an emergency...

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

We certainly will try.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair

I know that.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

We will make every effort to try.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair

I'm sure you would. But you don't have to.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

In an emergency situation, we can take appropriate action. Yes sir.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair

Now one of the things that's curious to me is, General Arnold you said that you did not learn of the Presidential order until after the United 93 had already crashed. That was about a little after ten o'clock in the morning. The first notice of difficulty here was at 8:20 in the morning when a transponder goes off on the American flight 11.

I don't know how significant that is but twenty minutes later you had notification of a possible hijack. So there is a long lapse of time here between the time you are initially alerted and you receive the order that you could shoot that aircraft down. Am I right about that?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

That's correct.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair

In your timeline, why don't you put in there when you were notified?

Col. Alan Scott

For which flight, Sir?

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair

(Crosstalk) Well, getting the notification from the President of the United States that you have the authority to shoot a commercial aircraft down is a pretty significant event. Why would that not be in your timeline?

Col. Alan Scott

I don't know when that happened.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair

Have you ever received that kind of a notice before?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

Not to my knowledge.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair So this is the first time in the history of the country that such an order had ever been given, so far as you know.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

Yes, sir. I'm sure there is a log that would tell us that and I appreciate the question.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair

Yeah, maybe you could let us know that. And then finally, as I understand your testimony, it was not possible to shoot down any of these aircraft before they struck. Is that basically correct?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

That is correct. In fact, the American Airlines 77, if we were to have arrived overhead at that particular point, I don't think that we would have shot that aircraft down.

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair

Because?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

Well, we had not been given authority to shoot down (crosstalk)

Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair

You didn't have authority at that point.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

And, you know, it is through hindsight that we are certain that this was a coordinated attack on the United States.

John Lehman, Commissioner

But had you gotten scrambled earlier, notified earlier of 77's deviance about when it turned east, for instance, certainly you could have gotten the F-16s there and presumably there would have been time to communicate to either get or be denied authority, no? For 77.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

I believe that to be true. I believe that to be true. It had to happen very fast but I believe that be true.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

What efforts were made that day to contact the President to seek that authority?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

I do not know.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Who would have been in the chain of command seeking authority from the President with whom anyone at NORAD was communicating?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

Can you answer that?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

The command director in Cheyenne Mountain is connected with the Combatant Commander who would have had the telephone lines open at that point. But I don't have knowledge of what happened that day – but that would be the way it would be done.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

The flow would be through the Secretary of Defense obviously to ....

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

But the Secretary of Defense was under attack in the Pentagon.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

He was evacuating – yes sir.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Now in terms of anything you know today, looking backwards, including all the after-action reports and various studies which I'm sure have been conducted internally and I'm sure which we will wish to review. Can you not tell us whether there was any effort made to contact the President to seek authority in dealing with what appeared to be a coordinated attack?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

I don't have knowledge at this time to make a comment on that, sir.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

I don't have knowledge of that. Our actions, our actions were to try to get aircraft in position to intercept if necessary.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Just going back because now I'm confused by on the one hand your statement that the closing of the airspace over Washington provided de facto authority to take whatever measures were necessary to deal with hostile aircraft and your statement that we probably would not have shot down 77 if we had arrived in time.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

The airspace had not been shut down over Washington, D.C. at that time.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

What time was that? Is that on the timeline?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

I believe it is. I believe it was reported by Secretary Mineta – the timeline that that occurred.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

It's not on your timeline.

Col. Alan Scott

No sir, it's not.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Well do you know what time that was?

Col. Alan Scott

Sir, the only thing I've seen is we have a copy provided by Gen. Worley (phonetic) of an Andrews Tower transmission that announced to all aviation traffic that Class B airspace was closed and that air traffic that did not cooperate would be shot down.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

What time was that, Col. Scott?

Col. Alan Scott

Sir, we'd have to go to the tower logs and we can get that for you. The tower log will show us what time that transmission was made but I don't know what time it was made.

Richard Ben-Veniste

And on whose order was that directive given that any plane in this sector would be shot down?

Col. Alan Scott

Unknown to me, sir.

John Lehman, Commissioner

Would you be able to provide that to the best of your ability... (crosstalk)

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

We'll do everything we can to provide that for the record, sir.

John Lehman, Commissioner

as from the higher authority, as well, so we can get on the record that chain of command during that period. I have one last question on 175, that never turned its transponder off and apparently you were never notified that it was a possible hijacking. Was that because it continued not to communicate with ATC? Or did it deviate from its course?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

I can't tell you why we were not notified. You would have to ask the FAA but that aircraft was a very, as I understand it, a fairly short flight. And we were not notified; I can't tell you why.

Thomas Kean, Chair

Commissioner Gorelick

Jamie Gorelick, Commissioner

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I would actually like to follow-up on some of your questions about the respective roles of NORAD, Northern Command, and the Defense Department generally, vis-a-vis, law enforcement. As Commissioner Ben-Veniste averted to, when I was at the Justice Dept. and we were planning for the Atlanta Olympics, we rehearsed a number of scenarios with the Defense Department and the various components thereof who were responsible for providing support to the Olympics.

And when we got to the scenario of a domestic hijacking of a plane headed into a stadium and I asked what they thought the proper division of labor should be, I was told, and it won't come as any surprise to you Gen. Arnold given your testimony, that this is a law enforcement matter. And that the armed services will provide technical support to the FBI to shoot the aircraft down. And my response, of course, was that's preposterous. And, in fact, Gen. Arnold, I am glad to see and hear that when faced with a judgment of whether you should do your job in defending the United States or wait for someone from the FBI to call you, you decided to get the authority later because that is the only rational response. You probably could have gotten court martialed but one appreciates that sort of leadership.

I say this because it is clear that before September 11th, we know that the Defense Dept. discussed for decades what the appropriate role of our military should be in defending the domestic United States. This is not a new question. It was discussed up and down and across and I see Gen. McKinley nodding. Anyone who has been in the service for the period of time that you gentlemen have been know that. And clearly September 11th served if anything else, if nothing else, to break the resistance that had occurred to having a different view of what the appropriate role of the military should be.

So with that, with that background, I would like to just be very clear as to what has changed and what has not. As I understand it, the requirement of prior law enforcement requests has been eliminated. Is that correct?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

We are able under Operation Noble Eagle, which we are under presently, to respond to an event as a military entity, to be in position to support. As you said eloquently, we don't have time to wait anymore to launch our fighters. So we have to take proactive action to do that.

Jamie Gorelick, Commissioner

Thank you for that. And second of all, you, your radars are now as you put it are pointed inward as well. Is that correct?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

We have incorporated the radars that were there all along so that our military controllers can now see them, see those tracks of interest.

Jamie Gorelick, Commissioner

Now you remain reliant to a certain extent on the efficiency of the FAA's radar system, as Sec. Lehman pointed out. Are you completely comfortable that they are more than adequate to your mission?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

Ma'am, you are absolutely right, we are dependent upon the FAA. We are working closely with them and their programmers because there are some financial disconnects. The FAA looks at radar differently than the military does. They are optimizing their radar to control traffic for commerce. We, the military, need to see very specific data which the FAA doesn't need – it costs money to do that. Our programmers, along with the FAA have identified some disconnects in programmatics and senior leadership is aware of those disconnects. We want to make sure the radars last so that this mission can be done properly and effectively.

Jamie Gorelick, Commissioner

I would ask you to supply for the record, if you could, a statement of what would be necessary in the professional opinion of you and your colleagues to bring the FAA system, upon which you are now reliant, up to the standards that you think are required to defend the domestic United States.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

Yes ma'am.

Jamie Gorelick, Commissioner

The other issue which you have raised in your testimony is that of communication between the FAA and NORAD, or lack thereof. And one of the questions that came immediately to mind is why you would not be co-located with FAA so that there is no such communication issue. Are you now co-located with FAA and have a presence in its command center that opens up when there is an emergency?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

Ma'am, we've done a little of both. We, after Gen. Arnold had this tragedy occur on the 11th, the FAA provided us with liaisons at all our air defense sectors and our continental NORAD region and at NORAD. So we have real-time people that we can turn to and say, please use your communications channels so that we can get information. In addition, the National Capitol Region has stood up a coordination center at Herndon, Virginia, in the FAA building, where we have military personnel, members of Transportation Security, Secret Service and other federal agencies where they can coordinate the efforts in this area. So, that has helped us tremendously and we think we can continue to do that.

Jamie Gorelick, Commissioner

Thank you for that answer. And finally, in my list, are you comfortable that you now have the pre-placement of your resources, in terms of aircraft, etc., where they need to be to adequately defend our critical infrastructure in the United States?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

Yes ma'am, I believe at the present time, we have an adequate force structure to do that. The requirements change daily, weekly, based on the event. For example, if a space shuttle were to take off, we'd want to have aircraft at the Cape. So whenever we have a security event, the Olympics, the State of the Union, we move our fighters around in a flexible manner to respond to that. So we do have the capability based on intelligence and real-world need to do that.

Jamie Gorelick, Commissioner

We may want to follow-up in closed session on that issue. As the charter for NORAD and the existence of Northern Command were being changed and created, there clearly would have been debate within the Pentagon over what the scope of that charter should be – and I speak as someone who served there twice. And I can imagine what some of those discussions might have been.

What authorities were contemplated to be given to Northern Command that haven't been and what authorities if you were writing that Charter on you own, would you give it?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

Ma'am, I don't mean to dodge the question but I don't know if I have the level of knowledge that you require for that answer. I will tell you, as a component commander who needs to employ resources in defense of United States citizens, I will tell you that the bi- national arrangement with Canada that NORAD has had for over forty years has worked exceptionally well for the threat period that we went through, the cold war and subsequently.

The stand-up of Northern Command has given us the ability to now tailor our forces and to work with local law enforcement so that we can respond to a critical need far more quickly. And we do it in a joint fashion with Navy, Marine Corp, Army, our Guardsmen, our Reservists and our United States Air Force. So, the Northern Command framework, as I see it, and we're still in initial operating capability. We'll become fully operational, capable when Gen. Eberhart says they are. We are learning, we are training together and exercising together and from my perspective, working exceedingly well.

Jamie Gorelick, Commissioner

And one final question of Gen. Arnold, we get some of our most candid advice from people who have taken their uniform off. And I use that phrase as well for civilians who no longer play whatever role they have happened to have played. Having lived through the searing moments of 9/11 and having had the awesome responsibilities that you had on that day and having had limited resources as you had on that day, legal and physical, to help prevent harm, what advice to you have for us about changes that we should make as a country.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

Well, I wrote a paper, no I didn't write a paper on that. But I think one would have to, that is probably where you are going to go. We are very fortunate that we have a country with so many resources. And let me point out, if I could, the, well you might, there could be criticism of what we did in response. It worked pretty well in terms of the after-action reports. Airplanes were getting airborne because people knew they had to get airborne. And I don't have the timelines for all of these things but as the President told the military to prepare to defend the country, we started gathering up all the aircraft that traditionally had not supported NORAD. And as soon as we could get armament to them, we either put them on orbit, as you recall we were on orbit for sometime throughout the country.

The Navy responded magnificently, as well. It was in the press. I had Adm. Dawson, Vice Admiral Dawson called me. He was on the George Washington at the time and he said we understand that Gen. Eberhart is the supported CINC and that you have been appointed the JFACC, the Joint Force Air Component Commander and we want to roll under your air tasking order. Had Vice Admiral Bucky of Third Fleet who was steaming an aircraft carrier toward the West Coast to do the same thing. So the system, in terms of military cooperation worked tremendously well.

I would also hasten to say that during the course of time, as we were on orbit and our resources were extremely limited in many cases because we initially could not see even what the FAA could see, we used our very straight AWACs aircraft, our warning aircraft that are used all over the world, and Brig. Gen. Ben Robinson was stretched very thin. But he continued to do what he could. The United States Customs provided us with E3s, with radars that gave us coverage in other parts of the area. And as Gen. McKinley alluded to, we were able to bring in units, Air National Guard and active duty computer air control units – units that are designed to be deployed and integrate them into our air picture – not only for air but also for voice. So we did a lot of things early on. But the things that were missing, in particular, immediately were: number one, we couldn't see into the interior of the country, we couldn't talk to our aircraft that were airborne to the interior of the country and we did not have a command and control system that would absorb the number of radars. And we were able to do that very rapidly.

That coupled with the creation of the Dept. of Homeland Security and with the Northern Command has provided defense in depth to, in my opinion, to protect this country in a way that it has never been defended before. It's in depth at the present time. So it's, we need to continue down those avenues. I'm sure there are ways to improve it. I'm sure that Gen. McKinley will find those ways. Gen. Eberhart is engaged in that, as well. But I feel comfortable that we have done those things that we ought to have done in order to provide security before a certain hijacking would occur. And, of course, God forbid, if that were to occur again, we are now positioned to be able to see, to be able to talk, to be able to provide command and control, and we have exercised repeatedly our capability to pass an order, a military order, down to the pilot in the airplane or the soldier next to his air defense artillery.

Jamie Gorelick, Commissioner

Thank you very much.

Thomas Kean, Chairman

Our last questioner is Congressman Roemer.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to again commend you and our Vice Chairman and the staff for all the work that you have put into this hearing. Especially this panel, this is very helpful to us and plowing ground that the Joint Inquiry did not get into. And I just want to make sure that you recognize how important that is and we are very grateful for your time, gentlemen, and your help and the good work that has gone into setting this hearing up. Gen. Arnold, you were there that day. Correct?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

Yes sir.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

And you had been there how long?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

I'd been the commander since Dec. 19, 1997. So I had been there for some time. I was approaching the end of my tour.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

Let me keep you on the hot seat, as Jamie Gorelick has put you there, and ask you a question about military threats, threats to the United States and the way we try to get intelligence, as the world changes from a cold war to terrorist threats that can come at us from almost anywhere, at anytime in nimble quick dynamic ways. Were you aware at all of the fatwa that Osama bin Laden had put out in February of 1998 that said he wanted to kill Americans, all Americans, everywhere he could, whether that was in the Middle East or in the United States of America?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

The answer to that is yes and we had briefings that, our own briefings I think we could even provide date back to 1998 where we called Osama bin Laden the most dangerous man in the world. And our focus, with the demise of the Soviet Union Warsaw Pact, in accordance with the Hart-Rudman study, was that we felt like the greatest threat to the United States would come from a terrorist, a rouge, or rouge nation. Or I should say a nation of concern.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

And then were you aware of George Tenet's statement in December of 1998 that the United States was at war with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

I don't recall that but I suppose I was generally aware of that - that the United States was at war with terrorism around the world.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

One of the frustrations is that in looking at this issue very carefully over the last year and a half, a lot of our people responsible for these kinds of things did not know of George Tenet's declaration or did not know of Osama bin Laden's declaration. If Vladimir Putin had made that declaration, as the leader of a nation state, we would probably all be aware of it.

If Kim Jung Il of North Korean or Saddam Hussein had made those statement in '98, we would probably all be aware of it. And that combined with the intelligence that was coming in over the decades of the 1990s that pointed to planes as weapons, we need to look back not to blame anybody but to try to make sure that this kind of information can get into the right hands in the future so that we can respond nimbly and quickly to this very nimble and quick threat that is directed directly at the heart of America. And I would be very, very attentive to any suggestions you would have now that you have stepped away from that most important job that you took on for our country and for our people, and performed very well, I'm sure. What do we need to do to breakdown these barriers of communication and increase the exchange of information so that we can respond quickly to this threat that will continue to come at us.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

Mr. Commissioner, I think I've stated that earlier – what I thought we had done. In terms, of the intelligence community and awareness, I think we are at a greater awareness today than we ever were before and I would leave that up to, perhaps, to Gen. McKinley, not trying to duck the question but I think I've answered that pretty much before.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

Well if you think of more specific answers, please provide those for the record. Let me ask you a question about the time difference between the scrambling and the battle stations and getting airborne. The F-15s at Otis, which was about, what was the total timeframe there with the F-15s at Otis?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

I believe that from the time they were notified to the scramble, it was six minutes.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

Six minutes

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

Yes sir

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

Notified, scrambled and then airborne.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

Notified, scrambled, and airborne, I believe that was six minutes as Col. Scott has (garbled)

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

So, a total of ...

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

No, there were on battle stations because the Northeast Air Commander had put them on battle stations. But once we said scramble, then I believe it was six minutes.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

And then comparatively, for the F-16s at Langley, what was the total time it took to ....

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

Again, if I can look at our data here, I believe it was, they were reported airborne at 9:35 and I think we would show that we actually...

Col. Alan Scott

We got fresh radar data at 9:30. I believe they were ordered to scramble at 9:24. The 9:35 report is .....

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

Correct

Col. Alan Scott

when they were reported to have been airborne.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

Six minutes

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

Six minutes, again

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

And these fighters, Sir, have up to 15 minutes to get airborne. And it is very intricate, as Secretary Lehman knows, to get an airplane without anybody in it, started, cranked, inertialized, to the runway, get it clearanced, get it in the air. Then six minutes is exceedingly quick.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

So at 9:35, those F-16s are airborne.

(crosstalk)

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

I think they were airborne at 9:30, actually. And that they were reported airborne at 35, I'll correct my error here, if I could, please.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

Okay. You were in the room when Secretary Mineta talked a little bit about arriving at the White House at about 9:20 and then overhearing a conversation at about 9:24 or 9:25 between the Vice President and a young aide, where he inferred that there was already an order in place for a shoot down. And he assumed it was for American Airlines 77. So sometime even before 9:20, there was an order in place that he overheard in the Presidential Executive Operations Center, that had some exchange between, I assume, the Vice President, the President, and maybe the Special Ops situation room. And they had determined that they would have the authority communicated to somebody to shoot down American Airlines Flight 77. Were you at all aware of anything sometime after 9:15 or 9:20 to shoot down American Airlines Flight 77?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

I was never aware of any order given to shoot down American Airlines 77.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

So nothing was ever conveyed to you by the White House or by the FAA Administrator or by the Secretary of Transportation on Flight 77?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

That's correct.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

So the only time you ever received information on a shoot down was on Flight #93 and that was ...

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

After the fact.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

That was, excuse me?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

After the fact.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

That was after the fact and that was after 10:00.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

That's correct

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

And that was from who?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

It was from Cheyenne Mountain, I assume from the commander of North American Air Defense Command.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

So your assumption is is that the White House communicated that to Cheyenne Mountain and then Cheyenne Mountain communicated ...

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold through the National Military Command Center. Correct.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

And when you had that after the fact, as Commissioner Hamilton asked you, that was at what time?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

I believe the time, we do not have a record of this, I remember the time being somewhere around 10:05. But we do not show that in this ....

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

We'll try to find that accurately and depict it for the record, Sir, because that's probably an important time you'd like to have.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

I think it's critically important. Col. Scott, were you in on any of that information about the Presidential authority to shoot down Flight 93?

Col. Alan Scott

No Sir, at the time I was upstairs with the Crisis Action Team.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

And Gen. McKinley?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

I was trying to get out of the Pentagon which was on fire, Sir.

Tim Roemer, Commissioner

So, Gen. Arnold, with respect to this decision, if you can get anymore details on the timing and any information on Flight 77, that would be very helpful to us. Thank you again for your great service to the country.

Thomas Kean, Chairman

Col. Scott, Maj. Gen. Arnold and Maj. Gen. McKinley, thank you very much. You have been very helpful today and we appreciate it and thank you.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission. Thank you very much.

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printed from Transcript 911-Commission (2nd Hearing) -Pt.2 on 2004-04-30 11:05:10