The report claims, that "prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community was not prepared to handle the challenge it faced in translating the volumes of foreign language counterterrorism intelligence it collected"

The report states, that "prior to September 11, 2001, the Intelligence Community did not effectively develop and use human sources to penetrate the al-Qa’ida inner circle"

The reports continues then with Chapter I -"THE JOINT INQUIRY", which doesn't include anything helpful for the investigation of September 11th.

Squeezed in here a summary on the 2001 Anthrax Attacks:

It is claimed, that "no connection has been established between the anthrax attacks and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001". It is not mentioned, that the hijackers had been connected with the landlord of the first Anthrax Victim Bob Stevens. Fort Detrick is not mentioned.

The Chapter then continues with many indexed parts (TOP SECRET), mentioning the "the Radical Fundamentalist Unit" at the FBI, created in March 1994.

Chapter III: "FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS"

"The National Security Agency (NSA), for example, reported at least 33 communications indicating a possible, imminent terrorist attack in 2001. Senior U.S. Government officials were advised by the Intelligence Community on June 28 and July 10, 2001, that the attacks were expected, among other things, to "have dramatic consequences on governments or cause major casualties" and that "[a]ttack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning."

Many parts in this chapter indexed as TOP SECRET.

Then Richard Armitage: "We issued between January and September nine warnings"

Then National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice: She "stated in a May 16, 2002 press briefing that, on August 6, 2001, the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) included information about Bin Ladin’s methods of operation from a historical perspective dating back to 1997. One of the methods was that Bin Ladin might choose to highjack an airliner in order to hold passengers hostage to gain release of one of their operatives."

Following parts are indexed as TOP SECRET.

Then Paul Wolfowitz: "I don’t recall any warning of the possibility of a mass casualty attack using civilian airliners or any information that would have led us to contemplate the possibility of our shooting down a civilian airliner."

The report continues with mentioning communications of the NSA regarding Nawaf al- Hazmi. Many parts in this paragraph indexed as TOP SECRET.

The NSA obviously did their job:

"In late 1999, NSA analyzed communications involving a suspected terrorist facility in the Middle East that included the names of Khaled and Nawaf. At this time, NSA did not associate the latter individual with the Nawaf al-Hazmi it had learned about in early 1999. Later, the two individuals [ ] were determined to be Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, now known to be two of the September 11 hijackers. [ ]. This information was passed to the CIA as well as the FBI in late 1999. In early 2000, NSA also [ ] passed additional information about Khalid to the CIA, FBI, FAA, the Departments of State, Treasury, Transportation, and Justice, and others in the U.S. Government"

No mentioning whatsoever, what the CIA and other Departments did with that information.

The report continues with the Malaysia Meeting in early 2000 "regarding Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi"."By early January 2000, CIA knew al-Mihdhar’s full name and that it was likely Nawaf’s last name was al-Hazmi".

The CIA was aware that they had been traveling together, and had documents indicating that al-Mihdhar held a U.S. B-1B-2 multiple entry visa that would allow him to travel to and from the United States until April 6, 2000., but the CIA "did not add the names of these two individuals to the State Department, INS, and U.S. Customs Service watchlists".

Following parts indexed as TOP SECRET.

"On January 4, 2001, CIA acquired information that Khallad, a principal planner in the bombing of USS Cole, had, along with al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, attended the January 2000 meeting in Malaysia. Again, the CIA did not watchlist these two individuals."

"In interviews, CIA personnel could not confirm that the visa information had in fact been provided to the FBI." "al-Mihdhar obtained a new U.S. visa and, on July 4, 2001, he re-entered the United States. It was not until mid July 2001, that a concerned CIA officer assigned to the FBI triggered a CIA review of its cables regarding the Malaysia meeting"

Many parts in this chapter indexed as TOP SECRET.

"Other FBI offices with potentially useful informants, such as San Diego, were not notified prior to September 11." More parts indexed as TOP SECRET.

5.d: "Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, had numerous contacts with a long time FBI counterterrorism informant in California and that a third future hijacker, Hani Hanjour, apparently had more limited contact with the same informant. In mid- to late-2000, the CIA already had information indicating that al-Mihdhar had a multiple entry U.S. visa and that al-Hazmi had in fact traveled to Los Angeles, but the two had not been watchlisted and information suggesting that two suspected terrorists could well be in the United States had not yet been given to the FBI."

Other parts regarding these informants indexed as TOP SECRET.

Parts on the Phoenix Warning are indexed. No names are given of the Informants, however they are well known and had been dropped to many different Newspapers.

Parts on Hani Hanjour are now indexed. No mentioning of Aukai Collins, the FBI informant.

A name of a suspect, connected to the "Phoenix communication" is indexed, who was arrested in Pakistan in 2002.

5.f is again about the " FBI Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui".

Many parts got indexed as TOP SECRET. No mentioning of information received by the French Intelligence. "FBI’s focus shifted to arranging for Moussaoui’s deportation to France on September 17"

Next Chapter 5.g. "Hijackers In Contact With Persons of FBI Investigative Interest"

"Hani Hanjour, Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and Khalid al- Mihdhar may have had contact with a total of 14 people who had come to the FBI’s attention"

"Four of those 14 were the focus of active FBI investigations during the time that the hijackers were in the United States"

"Two future hijackers had numerous contacts with an active FBI counterterrorism informant while in the United States." No further informations about these informants or "14 people", which interestingly adds up to 19.

Chapter 5.h "Hijackers’ Associates in Germany".

"Mamoun Darkazanli" is mentioned. The report states, that the CIA "had been seeking more information about Darkazanli." The report doesn't mention, that the CIA actually tried to hire him as an informant. The Report also ignores, that Darkanzali was under surveillance by German Intelligence, who updated their informations about Mohammad Atta. Both Atta and Darkanzali knew each other. Many parts now indexed as TOP SECRET.

Chapter 5j regarding KSM is indexed a lot and mentions that "in the period from September 8 to September 10, 2001 NSA intercepted, but did not translate or disseminate until after September 11, some communications that indicated possible impending terrorist activity"

"Another communication, between [ ] and an unknown person [ ]"

The following conclusion : "CIA employees failed to watchlist al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi"

In another following chapter an interesting oxymoron:

"The Intelligence Community is a large distributed organism. It encompasses 14 agencies and tens of thousands of employees. The number of people [page 42] employed exclusively in the effort against Usama Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida was relatively small. "

"When asked why there was no marshaling of personnel to CTC to fight Bin Ladin’s network, the former Chief of CTC recalled that the CIA’s Deputy Director of Operations said there were not enough personnel to go around and CTC was already well-endowed with people as compared to other divisions in CIA."

This chapter is very repetitive about what was said already before. Many parts still indexed as TOP SECRET.

It appears now, that the FBI had obviously more money, already monitoring 14 people to have been in connection with 5 of the hijacker suspects.

"NSA Director Hayden testified that NSA was focused heavily on several other high priority intelligence targets", but didn't mention, which one.

"Former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger emphasized the added funding that was provided for counterterrorism: [page 51] . . . the Clinton Administration more than doubled the federal government’s counterterrorism spending from $5 billion in FY [Fiscal Year] 1996 to over $11 billion in FY 2000"

The report doesn't tell, how the CIA spent that money.

On "March 6, 2001 cable from the field that called attention to the portion of the March 5 cable regarding al-Hazmi’s travel to the United States, but CTC personnel also did not read that cable at the time."

The report continues to be very repetitive.

Then something about ex-CIA Cofer Black, who was fired at the end of 2001 (not mentioned in that report):

"In late 2000, according to FAA officials, FAA offered CTC Chief Cofer Black the support of its nearly two-dozen analysts regarding transportation security issues in exchange for broader information sharing, but this offer was not accepted because of CTC concerns about protecting its sources and methods."

Former ex-CIA and ex-FBIHQ Dale Watson is mentioned:

"Counterterrorism Dale Watson testified that he could not recall any instance where the FBI Headquarters terrorism analytical unit produced "an actual product that helped out."

No mentioning of Colleen Rowley.

FBI Mueller claims: "We have not had either the technology nor the analytical cadre of individuals that we have needed to perform strategic analysis"

The chapter still continues with many indexed TOP SECRET parts with complaining about lack of "counterterrorism training".

Another quote of Sandy Berger: "I think we live in a world . . .in which expertise increasingly does not exist in the government. It’s a very complicated world. And the five people who know Afghanistan the best or Sierra Leone the best are probably located either in academia, think tanks or in companies, not to devalue the people of the government."

Then another cryptic and indexed part about the NSA:

"Similarly, NSA has long had a program to use [ ], but again little was known about al-Qa’ida targets"

No mentioning of the program PROMIS and 911-Insider Trading.

However: "NSA and CIA officers often worked closely together in [ ] collection efforts against al-Qa’ida."

An unnamed FBI agent: "no one at CIA advised the FBI about al-Mihdhar’s U.S. visa and the fact that al-Hazmi had traveled to the United States. Ironically, this occurred despite the fact that both CIA and FBI personnel were at the time working in CTC where the information was received"

Following more TOP SECRET parts. NOTE: It appears, as if the TOP SECRET parts have been printed into this report systematically. There is no break of grammar structure. One can speculate, that the real Censorship might be somewhere else. In my ongoing analysis i will therefore ignore these TOP SECRET notes. They're basically everywhere.

The report continues with parts which put emphasis on intelligence failure or "incompetence". It's still very repitive, so that one can scroll very easily for a long time. Basically no new facts came up.

Another part on the CIA, which claims, that they "had no access to al-Qa’ida’s leadership" (we know from News Reports, that they confirmed, they had placed moles into their "organisation")

Page 107: "The CIA’s actual efforts to carry out covert action against Bin Ladin in Afghanistan prior to September 11, 2001 were limited and do not appear to have significantly hindered al-Qa’ida’s ability to operate. [ ]: " Followed by a lot of TOP SECRET parts.

Page 121 on FinCEN: "FinCEN was involved in tracking terrorist funds prior to September 11 and experienced some success. FinCEN began doing linkage analysis of terrorist financing in October 1999 and first identified a specific account with a direct link to al-Qa’ida in February 2001."

On Saudi Arabia: "...the Director of OFAC at the Treasury Department testified that he made two trips to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait in 1999 and 2000 to request their cooperation in tracking and restricting Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida funds, but only achieved limited results..."

Page 131 On more early warnings: "In June 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information from several sources that Usama Bin Ladin was considering attacks in the United States, including against Washington, D. C. and New York"

"In August 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to crash an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center"

"In October 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that al- Qa’ida was trying to establish an operative cell within the United States"

Part 2 of the Report is another repetitive "narrative" version of Sep11th

Page 151 confirmed, that they had al-Midhar's passport number:
"DCI Tenet testified that, "[i]n early January 2000, we managed to obtain a photocopy of al-Mihdhar’s passport as he traveled to Kuala Lumpur." This gave the CIA al-Mihdhar’s full name, his passport number, and birth information. It also showed that al-Mihdhar held a U.S. visa, issued in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in April 1999, that would not expire until April 2000."

NSA confirmed, they had the Hazmi-Brothers in sight in 1999:
"At the time of the meeting in Kuala Lumpur, we had the al- Hazmi brothers, Nawaf and Salem, as well as Khalid al-Mihdhar, in our sights."

Who was this unknown CIA employee (Page 154)?:
"The CIA Headquarters employee who had direct responsibility for tracking the movement of the attendees at the Malaysia meeting does not recall either the March 5 or March 6, 2000 messages concerning al-Hazmi’s travel to the United States."

The Visa "sloppery": "On June 13, 2001, al-Mihdhar obtained a new U.S. visa in Jeddah, using a different passport than the one he had used to enter the United States in January 2000. On his visa application, he checked "no" in response to the question whether he had ever been in the United States."

Another "ignored" cable, but THIS TIME to the FBI: "On August 23, 2001, the CIA sent a cable to the State Department, INS, Customs, and FBI requesting that "Bin Ladin-related individuals," al-Mihdhar, al-Hazmi, Khallad, and one other person at the Malaysia meeting, be watchlisted immediately and denied entry into the United States "due to their confirmed links to Egyptian Islamic Jihad operatives and suspicious activities while traveling in East Asia."

And with positive results: "On August 24, the State Department watchlisted al-Mihdhar, al-Hazmi, and the others listed in the CIA cable."

But an FBI agent complained: "Whatever has happened to this - someday someone will die — and wall or not — the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain ‘problems.’ Let’s hope the [FBI’s] National Security Law Unit (NSLU) will stand behind their decisions [about the "wall"] then, especially since the biggest threat to us now, UBL, is getting the most ‘protection.’"

The FBI was searching for al-Midhar: "An FBI agent determined on September 5 that al-Mihdhar had not registered at a New York Marriott.

Page 165: "Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar Had Numerous Contacts with an FBI Informant"

Now the FBI claimed, that "the FBI’s San Diego field office did not learn until after September 11 that the CIA had information that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were affiliated with al-Qa’ida"

Another Informant (probably that was Aukai Collins) : "the informant met Hanjour in December 2000 and are unable to explain why the informant failed to identify Hanjour"

Until this part of the 911 Report, noone of any Informants are mentioned by name, though their names had been leaked to the press: Mamoun Darkanzali (Germany-cell), Atif Ahmed (Moussaoui), CIA moles at Al-Quaeda (www.usatoday.com/news/attack/2002/06/03/cia-attacks.htm ), Aukai Collins (Hanjour), Randy Glass (ISI agents), Abdussattar Shaikh (Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi) and Omar Bayoumi (probably connected with Saudi Intelligence)

Another confirmation on other informants or observations of some "hijackers":
Page 177: "al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Hanjour, Muhammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and possibly others had contact with people who had come to the FBI’s attention during counterterrorism or counterintelligence inquiries or investigations"

Then we find the CIA remark, that "according to CIA documents, [ ] in June 2001 [ ] al-Qa’ida operative Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was recruiting persons to travel to the United States and engage in planning terrorist-related activity here."

Who is the unknown "Iman"?:
"Since September 11, the FBI has learned that al-Bayoumi has connections to terrorist elements. He has been tied to an imam abroad who has connections to al-Qa’ida"

More on Bayoumi's ties to Saudi Intelligence or "another foreign power":
"One of the FBI’s best sources in San Diego informed the FBI that he thought that al-Bayoumi must be an intelligence officer for Saudi Arabia or another foreign power."

Page 184: TOP SECRET PARTS about ties of Osama Bassnan with other hijackers (Names NOT mentioned!!):
"Although the FBI has not developed definitive evidence that Osama Bassnan, another Saudi national living in San Diego, had ties to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, the following information obtained by the Joint Inquiry suggests such a connection: • Bassnan was a close associate of al-Bayoumi, [ ]. Bassnan also had close ties to a number of other persons connected to the hijackers, including [ ]. • [ ].

"Bassnan lived in the apartment complex in San Diego across the street from al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar"

Bassnan was known to the FBI since 1992! :
"In May 1992, the State Department provided the FBI with a box of documents recovered from an abandoned car. The documents were in Arabic, and one, a newsletter to supporters of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) Movement, provided updates on the EIJ’s council and was marked "confidential." The box contained letters addressed to Bassnan that discussed plans to import used cars to the United States."

The report doesn't explain, why the investigation on Bassnan was closed in December 1992, though he "had hosted a party for the "Blind Sheikh" in Washington, D.C. in 1992"

Who blocked this investigation?

More on the unknown "iman" :"This iman moved to Falls Church, Virginia in 2001"

The report doesn't mention the pattern of "Falls Church"
In Falls Church is also the Britain Defense Staff, Navy Deployment Surveillance Team, Defense Information Systems Agency, World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Kh. al-Midhar, M. Moqed, H. Hanjour all three lived there), Unification Church International, the FBI, Abdullah Bin Laden lived there, and Center for Islamic Information and Education has its main organisation there.

The report however mentions, that "in 2001, hijackers al-Hazmi and Hanjour also moved to Falls Church"

More on the "Imam" on page 187: "In early 2000, the imam was visited by a subject of a Los Angeles investigation closely associated with Blind Sheikh al-Rahman"

The report now confirms, that "Darkazanli were known to U.S. [ ] before September 11." (It doesn't mention however, that the CIA tried to hire him or received any informations on him and Mohammad Atta by German Intelligence BND)

"Darkazanli was in contact with a number of Islamic extremists, including []." (Who was the source for this info?)

The report continues with the spanish ties, but doesn't mention, that Spanish police intercepted Phone calls between Atta and Darkanzali-friend Yarkas. The name Atta is not mentioned here:
"Spanish authorities intercepted a call to Yarkas on August 27, in which he was told, "we have entered the field of aviation and we have even slit the throat of the bird." TOP SECRET Parts in that chapter. Spanish Intelligence is not mentioned.

Interestingly, the report confirms, that also the FBI was in touch with Darkanzali:
"The FBI became interested in Darkazanli in 1998 after the arrests of Wadi El-Hage and Abu Hajer, operatives in Bin Ladin’s network."

Now the report claims, in opposite to german newspaper articles and the BND itself:

"The German government apparently did not consider Islamic groups a threat and were unwilling to devote significant investigative resources to this target." (more TOP SECRET parts in this chapter)

Beginning from Page 198, the Report analyses the role of the Saudi Visas, but doesn't mention details of the Visas and the name of the city of the Consulate: Jeddah

More early warnings on Page 209:
"In August 1999, the Community obtained information that Bin Ladin’s organization had decided to target the U.S. Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and DCI."

"In March 2000, the Community obtained information regarding the types of targets that operatives in Bin Ladin’s network might strike. The Statue of Liberty was specifically mentioned, as were skyscrapers, ports, airports, and nuclear power plants.

Page 211: "In April 2001, the Community obtained information from a source with terrorist connections who speculated that Bin Ladin was interested in commercial pilots as potential terrorists."

"in the spring and summer of 2001....During that period, the Intelligence Community detected a significant increase in information that Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida intended to strike against U.S. interests in the very near future."

"Between May and July, the National Security Agency reported at least thirty-three communications suggesting a possibly imminent terrorist attack.

"In July, the CTC became aware of a person who had recently been in Afghanistan who reported, "Everyone is talking about an impending attack."

"On August 16, the INS detained Zacarias Moussaoui in Minneapolis, Minnesota. His conduct had aroused suspicions about why he was learning to fly large commercial aircraft"

Page 204: "On August 23, CIA requested that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, who had first come to the attention of the CIA and NSA in 1999 as possible associates of Bin Ladin’s TOP SECRET TOP SECRET network, be added to the Department of State watchlist"

Page 215: "On September 10, NSA intercepted two communications [ ] suggesting imminent terrorist activity. These communications were not translated into English and disseminated until September 12." (What kind of automatic translation program does the NSA run?)

Then again, the "August 6, 2001, the President’s Daily Brief (PDB)" is mentioned, but not added with its full text into the 911 Report. Why?

Page 216 about warnings at the FAA: "An FAA Circular on June 22, 2001, referring to a possible hijacking plot by Islamic terrorists to secure the release of fourteen persons incarcerated in the United States in connection with the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers"

"A public, worldwide caution issued by the State Department on June 22, warning Americans traveling abroad of the increased risk of a terrorist action."

"Four terrorism warning reports or warning report extensions issued by the Department of Defense on June 22 and 26, and July 6 and 20, primarily to alert U.S. military forces and the Department of Defense"

"A State Department démarche to Taliban representatives in Pakistan on June 26, 2001, declaring that the Taliban would be held responsible for terrorist attacks carried out by Bin Ladin or al-Qa’ida"

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage: "We issued between January and September nine warnings..."

Page 220 might explain speculations about Unmanned planes on Sep11th:

"In 1997, an FBI Headquarters unit became concerned about the possibility that an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) would be used in terrorist attacks."

"The FBI and CIA became aware of reports that a group had purchased a UAV and concluded that the group might use the plane for reconnaissance or attack. The possibility of an attack outside the United States was thought to be more likely, for example, by flying a UAV into a U.S. embassy or a U.S. delegation."

More on Hijacking : "In April 2000, the Intelligence Community obtained information regarding an alleged Bin Ladin plot to hijack a Boeing 747. The source, a "walk-in" to the FBI’s Newark office, claimed that he had learned hijacking techniques and received arms training in a Pakistani camp."

"The former intelligence office at FAA, the Transportation Security Intelligence Service, researched 12 reports concerning the possible use of airplanes as weapons"

The National Security Council on their review "preparing a national security Presidential directive, and it was distributed on August 13": "The review was nearing completion in the days before September 11."

On Genoa: "Mr. Hadley noted that Bush Administration concerns before September 11 included the P-3 aircraft incident with China and the June 2001 G-8 Summit"

Page 243 On Bin Laden's "declaration of war": "Some senior managers at NSA and DIA were aware of the statement, but many in the FBI had not heard of it.... Cofer Black, former CTC Chief, explained in a statement to the Joint Inquiry: "[A]fter 9/11, the gloves came off]."

Page 246/47: US Plan of their palnned war against the Taliban before Sep11th:
"Mr. Hadley noted, "[t]he Administration finalized its review of policy on al-Qa’ida at an NSC Principals Committee meeting on September 4, 2001." President Bush had not reviewed the draft policy before September 11.

The report doesn't mention 10-12 oversea intelligence warnings on a pending attack.

More Quotes of Testimonies, here from Brent Scowcroft (Page 256):

"the safest place in the world for a terrorist to be is inside the United States"

Important Note: "Both NSA and FBI are authorized to access international communications between the United States and foreign countries."

"The FBI informed NSA when it learned of the suspected terrorist facility in August 1998."

Page 268, Point 255 to 260 on Budget, "Methodology and Limitations" are indexed as TOP SECRET

The CIA complains, that they "never had enough" personnel working on al-Qa’ida."

"NSA had only a limited number of Arabic linguists"

"FBI requests for additional personnel were cut or rejected"

"Former CTC Chief Black noted that shifting resources was difficult because the policy community had other demands for intelligence."

"Disadvantages of Relying on Foreign Liaison Services" (many indexed TOP SECRET parts)"the former Chief of CTC’s Bin Ladin unit testified that [ ]."

The report now stated, that "the U.S. has issued warnings based on information from liaison services — warnings required by U.S. policies — even though this angered the liaison service by potentially revealing its sources. More commonly, leaks are unauthorized, serve no policy purpose and simply anger liaison services whose sources and methods may be compromised."

Many TOP SECRET parts on Page 296ff on plans in 1998, to 'capture Bin Ladin and a U.S. Navy cruise missile strike to kill him"

"The White House refused to allow the Joint Inquiry to review the relevant documents, but []:"

The following parts deal with the same issue, still many parts are INDEXED, finally we read this:
"The President ordered the U.S. Navy on August 20, 1998 to launch cruise missiles against targets in Afghanistan and Sudan.All personnel interviewed on this matter by the Joint Inquiry concur that one objective of the strikes in Afghanistan was to kill Bin Ladin."

The report doesn't explain, why and who halted this mission by Clinton. The following parts are indexed as TOP SECRET, too. It was not mentioned, what the role of the old Chief of CTC was.

More on the pre-Sep11th planning of war in Afghanistan on Page 320:
"General Shelton, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained the military options beyond cruise missile strikes. In the fall of 2000, he prepared a paper containing 12 or 13 options for using military force against Bin Ladin. Several options reportedly involved "U.S. boots on the ground" in Afghanistan"

"He explained that he did not want U.S. military units to be dependent on the actions of CIA paramilitary units outside the military chain of command."

Page 324 on "Financial Tracking before September 11"
"FinCEN started doing linkage analysis of terrorist financing in April 1999 and first identified an account with a direct link to Bin Ladin in February 2001."

"CIA was able to determine that Khaled was KSM, that KSM was an uncle of Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the first World Trade Center bombing plot, and that KSM had married the sister of Yousef’s wife." But the report claims, that "he was not recognized as a senior al-Qa’ida lieutenant."

Many parts on KSM now classified as TOP SECRET, even here: "The Intelligence Community was not sure of KSM’s alliances until after [ ]. "

But: "The Intelligence Community knew that KSM had attended college in the United States in the 1980s.

Then another chapter on Moussaoui: "On August 11, Moussaoui and his roommate, Hussein al-Attas, arrived in Egan, Minnesota and checked into a hotel."
But al-Attas wasn't analysed in this report. No mention of Moussaouis motions in his pending trial.

Now very odd: "In a Joint Inquiry interview, a Minneapolis FBI field office agent said that a Supervisory Agent at Headquarters had suggested that Moussaoui be put under surveillance, but Minneapolis did not have enough agents to do that."

After Moussaoui's arrestment, "on August 21, the Minneapolis field office agent sent an e-mail to the RFU Supervisory Special Agent handling this matter: [It’s] imperative that the [U.S. Secret Service] be apprised of this threat potential indicated by the evidence. . . . If [Moussaoui] seizes an aircraft flying from Heathrow to NYC, it will have the fuel on board to reach D.C."

The CIA knew about Moussaoui, but the report doesn't mention any names of CIA officers:
"A CIA officer detailed to FBI Headquarters learned of the Moussaoui investigation from CTC personnel in the third week of August."

NOTE: The report confirmed several times, that the CIA monitored Khaled Al-Midhar and Nawaq Alhazmi and wrote a "cable" on them August 23rd 2001. At that time, FBI whistleblower Colleen Rowley (her name is not mentioned in this report) was already in contact with the NSLU and FBIHQ, which was finished on August 28th. The report doesn't ask or analyse, what happened within these 5 days? Why did the FBIHQ not react on the CIA cable and connect the dots of Moussaoui? Why wasn't Dale Watson, ex-FBIHQ, asked on this irregularity?

Also on Moussaoui's flight school, the report reveals (what many could read in some papers over the last year), that "In September 1999, one of the agents had been assigned a lead from the Orlando field office to inquire at the flight school about another individual, who had been identified as Usama Bin Ladin’s personal pilot and who had received flight training at Airman Flight School."

The report doesn't explain, why it then took a few months more after Sep11th to file an "indictment against Moussaoui". It was "filed on December 11, 2001"

More interesting, Moussaoui is claimed to have been "a marketing consultant in the United States for Infocus Tech. The letters had been signed in October 2000 by Yazid Sufaat, whom the Intelligence Community was aware was the owner of the Malaysian condominium used for the January 2000 al-Qa’ida meeting attended by hijackers al- Mihdhar and al-Hazmi."

Page 341 on "The Phoenix Electronic Communication"
"The Special Agent in Phoenix who wrote the EC told the Joint inquiry he first became concerned about aviation-related terrorism in the early 1990s" (Kenneth Williams' name is not mentioned)

"The Phoenix EC focused on ten individuals who were subjects of FBI investigations, Sunni Muslims from Kenya, Pakistan, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, India, and Saudi Arabia. Not all were in flight training; several were aeronautical engineering students, and one was studying international aviation security."

Page 343: "The agent described to the Joint Inquiry another incident that increased his suspicion about Middle Eastern flight students in the Phoenix area."

"Several Bin Ladin operatives had lived and traveled to the Phoenix area, and one of them -- Wadih El-Hage, a Bin -TOP SECRET TOP SECRET- Ladin lieutenant -- had been convicted for his role in the 1998 East Africa U.S. embassy bombings."

"When the Phoenix agent sent the EC to FBI Headquarters, he requested that the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) and the Usama Bin Ladin Unit (UBLU) consider implementing the suggested actions."

"The IOS also decided to forward the EC to the Portland FBI field office because a person named in the EC, with ties to suspected terrorists arrested in the Middle East in early 2001, was an employee of an airline and had previously lived and studied in the northwestern United States."

"Transportation Security Administration Assistant Undersecretary for Intelligence Claudio Manno testified at a Joint Inquiry hearing that "the first time that we saw [the Phoenix EC] was when it was brought to our attention by [the Joint Inquiry Staff]."

"The Phoenix EC was sent to two FBI New York field agents who specialize in Bin Ladin cases." (Names not mentioned. Was John O'Neill one of them? We know, he received an email of Williams)

The report also mentioned, that this agent this EC to individuals in the Usama Bin Ladin Unit (UBLU) and the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU), but doesn't mention the date: July 10, 2001

The report doesn't really explain, why the FBI headquarters personnel did not take the action requested by the Phoenix agent prior Sep11th.

It says, "the FBI lacked effective data mining capabilities and analytical tools"

But the report says, that "Hani Hanjour was, "associated with [ ], an individual who was mentioned in the Phoenix EC" (Wasn't Hanjour already in the FBI database since 1996?)

Furthermore, "Hanjour and the person named in the Phoenix EC trained together at a flight school in Arizona"

"The Bureau attempted to investigate this person in May 2001, but discovered that he was out of the country."

"The FBI has confirmed since September 11, 2001, that another individual mentioned in the Phoenix EC is also connected to the al-Qa’ida network. This individual was arrested [ ] in Pakistan in 2002 with [ ] "

The report also doesn't mention ex-FBI Robert Wright

On Page 360, an unknown female CIA agent is mentioned, who assigned at the NSA in 2000:
"A CIA analyst agreed to an assignment at NSA. While there, she was able to scour unpublished NSA transcripts for lead information, such as [ ], of utility to CTC operations. She left after four months without a replacement, despite CTC’s increasing need for leads. While the CIA analyst was at NSA, she had access to the CIA computer network, which is not otherwise available to NSA analysts."

Page 377 on the TIPOFF program:
"According to TIPOFF’s Director, from inception to Summer 2002, the program prevented 763 individuals from receiving visas to enter the United States. However, the Joint Inquiry was told that information flow into TIPOFF before September 11 was less than complete."

(Who updated this list? -"In August 2002 the State Department added over seven million names from FBI indices to a State watchlist")

Page 385: "In March 2000, the Department of Justice discovered substantive errors in factual applications presented to the FISA Court. By September 2000, the Department identified errors in -TOP SECRET TOP SECRET- about seventy-five FISA matters, and in March 2001 notified the FISA Court of additional errors."(what was changed and what is still clkasified?)

Page 386: "a CIA employee spoke to two FBI employees in January 2000 about the activities of future hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar in Malaysia, but did not tell them that he had a U.S. visa." (Who was this agent?)

Page 398: "Throughout June and July 2001... The U.S. military was sufficiently concerned that an attack would occur on the Arabian Peninsula that "ThreatCon Delta" was declared and all ships in the area were sent to sea..." (Did the CIA and FBI not know about "ThreatCon Delta"?)

Once again, as often, the 911 report jumps back to patterns of 1998, instead of constantly explaining the circumstances in 2001.

(Many parts classified in this NSA section)

(Many parts on HUMINT classified)

Page 414 again on the Anthrax attack in October 2001:
"To date, no connection has been established between the anthrax attacks and the terrorist attacks of September 11.", followed by TOP SECRET parts.

Pt.4 of the 911-report starts on Page 415: "FINDING, DISCUSSION AND NARRATIVE REGARDING CERTAIN SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS"

The report says, "It was not the task of this Joint Inquiry to conduct the kind of extensive investigation that would be required to determine the true significance of such alleged support to the hijackers. On the one hand, it is possible that these kinds of connections could suggest, as indicated in a CIA memorandum, "incontrovertible evidence that there is support for these terrorists [---------------------------]."

The following pages are classified as TOP SECRET (Page 416- Page 443, Point 396- Point 421) Only one name is dropped in this long classified section: "Mr. Bereuter"

Saudi Arabia is not mentioned

Page 444 continues with a "GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND KEY NAMES"

It starts with the "ACS FBI Automated Case System" and ends with "WTC World Trade Center" The Glossary contains also some classified parts, i.e at FinCEN

National Intelligence Daily is explained— "An Intelligence Community produced digest of current intelligence drafted six times a week for senior government officials. (Replaced by the SEIB)"

"PDB President’s Daily Brief (Prepared by CIA for President and very small number of other senior officials)"

The Glossary ends on Page 454.

The report continues with "Key Names" and explanations:

Mohamed Yousef

Mohamed Alqusaidi Marwan al-Shehhi's brother

Muhammed Atif Bin Ladin’s lieutenant

[ ]

[ ]

[ ]

Osama Bin Ladin US

Imad Mugniyah Hizbollah Leader

Khalid Shaykh Mohammad

Mohamed al-Owhali Passenger in truck bomb that jumped out of the bomb laden vehicle before it crashed into the American embassy in Kenya

Omar Abd al-Rahman Blind Sheikh

Ahmed Ressam

Ramzi Yousef

Ayman Zawarhari

Abu Zubaydah

TOP SECRET

Page 455 lists all 19 hijackers, but doesn't mention, that some identities are still alive

The report continues with "ADDITIONAL VIEWS AND APPENDICES" of individuals like Sen. Richard C. Shelby, Rep. Michael N. Castle, Sen. Mike DeWine, Rep. Jane Harman, Sen. Pat Roberts, Sen. Carl Levin, Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski and Rep. Tim Roemer.

It follows also with "Joint Inquiry Hearings", "List of Hearing Witnesses", List of Persons Interviewed" or "Selected Events In The Chronology Of Terrorism, 1982 — 2001"

The following analysis of Shelby is more opinion based and refers to many historical analogies or contains suggestions for the future. More or less he implies "incompetence", which led to Sep11th. He also claims, that there was a lack of information sharing.

Mike Devine comments on FISA Changes: "Congress should adopt the proposed Kyl/Schumer amendment to FISA and the proposed DeWine amendment to FISA."

Jane Harman claims, this report "provides the most complete and comprehensive assessment of the plot behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks."

Jon Kyl says "The record should also reflect some of the differences in opinion among Members on how the Report was (or should have been) prepared."

He also criticised, that "Due to dramatic media leaks and the potential for further compromise, intelligence agencies "pushed back" against open hearings, causing further friction with the JIS investigation."

" A case in point is the Arizona resident whose identity came out in the media. His name and face were even broadcast on Al-Jazeera."

The report "falls well short of addressing the core problems that led to 9/11."

Carl Levin reminds, that "a number of "lit fuses" were known to counter-terrorism officials during a period of time when our Intelligence Community was at a heightened state of alert over imminent attacks from al-Qaeda."

Senator Barbara A. Mikulski: "We owe it to the victims of the September 11th and anthrax attacks, their families, and the nation to find answers. Who knew what and when before the September 11th attacks? And if they didn’t know, why?" She continues with a list of suggestions of changes.

Tim Roemer is "congratulating the leadership of the Joint Inquiry for their bipartisanship, productivity, and helpful recommendations."

But Roemer complains, that one of his "great frustrations" during his "ervice on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has been the degree to which access to information is restricted, either from the committee or within the committee, often for reasons that have little or no correlation to national security."

"For example, during the Joint Inquiry, it became clear that individual government officials had been briefed about certain terrorist related information before September 11."

"The dates that these briefings took place were declassified...But the identity of the participants in the briefings, even by reference to the title of the offices they held, was not declassified."

"I agree with those who urge a more exhaustive investigation of the means through which the September 11 hijackers were supported financially while they were planning and training for the attacks."

In the Appendix, 100s of witnesses are listed, many names of FBI and CIA agents are classified for understandable reasons.
I miss however almost 100% of a suggested list of 150 other people, compiled at The Top 150 Subpoena list for the 911 Commission.

Interesting from the Witness list: I would like to hear more about the background of an "Assistant Legal Attache, Islamabad, Federal Bureau of Investigation"

The Pakistan Secret Service is not mentioned at all

Who spoke for "Booz Allen & Hamilton"? Why is this info so sensitive?

Why was noone from Huffman Aviation interviewed? Mohammad Atta's name is almost rarely mentioned in this report, too, though he was officially the "ringleader".

Almost nothing was revealed on the Stand Down Order, the Pentagon Attack, Flight 93, the Insider Trading and the Collapses of WTC 1,2 AND 7!

Conclusion:

The more repetitive the report became, the less "incompetent" the FBI looked for me. In one statement it even appeared for me, they already observed all 19 hijackers (4 + 15 associated). The budget issue is therefore a lame excuse. The FBI seemed more competent than the CIA.
The secretive parts about the sponsoring of the attack has obviously the reason to mystify Saudi Arabia instead of protecting it. One might think, instead of investigating the Jeddah-CIA ties, it suggests just another attack.

The report is way too long and too distractive at many parts.

It didn't answer many of well-known questions, most of them available on many independent 911 investigative websites, basically ignored from this report.

The report is more conclusive on suggestions than the investigation itself.

The report says basically nothing about "TIPOFF, a classified database within INR containing the names of foreigners who are not allowed to enter the United States because of ties to terrorism and other illegal activities"

The report didn't mention anything new, but maybe 3-6 interesting new details for me and produces at least 10-20 new questions

It would be interesting to learn more about this "Iman", the "San Diego conenction" and ALL informants.

It appears to me strange, that even Kenneth Williams and Colleen Rowleys' name has not been mentioned, who both are easily to be identified in this report. Both FBI agents became worldwide famous, Rowley won even the title of "Person of the year" at TIME, as one of three whistleblowers.

The "History of Terrorism" at the end of report let the report look stupid. America, though never really attacked at home before Sep11th, knew enough about terrorism, especially with aviation weapons. The report shows very clear, that the main suspects related to Sep11th, had been well known.

The report confirms, that a war against the Taliban was planned before Sep11th. It makes no sense, that noone at the FBI, NSA or CIA didn't know about that.

Ramzi Yousef's plan "Project Bojinka" was well known.

The pattern of increased warnings in Summer 2001 was well known, it wasn't explained, why no jets intercepted the hijacked Airplanes in time.

In January 2000, "DCI announces Abu Zubaida the #1 terrorist target."

The June "THREATCON Delta" Alert must have been known, definetely to the White House.

The pattern increased: "3 Aug. The IC continues to estimate that [ ] extremists associated with Al Qaeda are now prepared to conduct one or more terrorist attacks at any time."

The August 8th briefing of President Bush is classified in the report and indexed in the "history" at the end.

Very troubling: "The Joint Inquiry requested the opportunity to conduct an interview of the National Security Advisor to the President in May 2002 in order to obtain a better understanding of the development of counterterrorism policy in the Bush Administration before September 11, 2001. The NSC resisted this and suggested in June that the Deputy National Security Advisor be the subject instead and that written questions be provided instead of conducting an interview. The Joint Inquiry provided written questions in July but did not receive responses until November 2002."

Furthermore: If the FBI had so much luck with already observing the right people, why doesn't the report mentioning the other 200 people, who worked in the US as a sleeper cell? Did the FBI had not enough money to find them, too or just had luck from the beginning to find the right ones?

What happened after Aug23rd, when Nawaf al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were added to TIPOFF watchlist?

Why is there no analysis in the full 911-report on the 9 Sep. Assassination of Afghan Northern Alliance leader Masood, as mentioned in the History?

Why was the Pentagon on High Alert on Sep10th?

The Parts of Sep10th are classified, too!!

Why didn't the 911 Report mention the meeting between the ISI and CIA during the Sep11th week? And we could continue with our other classic questions and smoking guns, the report ignored.

Suggestion: This first analysis should be doublechecked with various media sources.

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printed from 911 Report- the first GFP analysis on 2004-06-22 17:02:51