

Anthrax

- **From US and UK intelligence sources...“The prima facie evidence of the involvement of a state intelligence agency. Maybe Iran has the capability. But it doesn’t look likely politically. That leaves Iraq.” David Rose, *The Observer*, October 14, 2001.**
- **...it is “increasingly looking like” the anthrax sent through the mail came from a US source. White House, December 18, 2001**

The anthrax story lingered. It wasn’t until the middle of December that the White House put out a paper (not an announcement) that said it looked as if the source of the anthrax were domestic. We would have expected in Gulf II to see the same kind of thing. If a story supports policy, even if incorrect, let it stay around.

Based upon what went before, as we moved into marketing of the war, we would have expected to see two things. We would have expected to see the creation stories to sell the policy; we would have expected to see the same stories used on both sides of the Atlantic. We saw both.

US/UK Stories

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Parallel Storyline<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Terrorism– “Armed conflict and regime”– Materials from Niger– 45 Minute release time– Surrender of the 51st Division– Uprising in Basrah– US/UK uniforms (picked up from Wilkinson report)– French & German precision switches (US in NYT; UK leaked UN Report)– Weapons labs– British Parliamentarian in pay of Iraq– Executing prisoners– Baghdad neighborhood bombings | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Not Parallel Storyline<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Aluminum tubes– Shock and Awe– “Paramilitaries” and not “terrorist death squads”– Terrorist threat– Private Lynch– Lt Commander Speicher– Cyber war capability– Dirty bombs– Woman hung for waving |
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The number of engineered or false stories from US and UK sources is long. These are some of them. It’s important, however, to point out that the UK did not always go along.

I’ll come to the connective network that made possible the parallel effort toward the end of the report.

Everything was not sinister, but when you begin with the small things, you again see a pattern that become important in understanding the larger distortions of the truth.

Characterizing the Action

ARMED CONFLICT WITH IRAQ BEGAN ON MARCH 20, 2003

The Department of State advises American citizens in Austria to take prudent steps to ensure their personal safety in the coming days. Remain vigilantly aware of surroundings, avoid crowds and demonstrations, keep a low profile, vary times and routes for all travel, and ensure travel documents are current. Listen to news reports and maintain contact with the U.S. Embassy/Consulate at (01) 31339-7535. The Embassy/Consulate will also post updated information on our website

- **US and UK had agreed it would be called “armed conflict.”**

It was agreed, first of all, that the activity would be called “armed conflict.” State Department documents used the term. Alastair Campbell, the UK strategic communications manager, had a list of guidance items for Tony Blair’s press people. The armed conflict guidance was part of that list. (Peter Stothard, [Tony Blair and the Test of History: Thirty Days](#))

“Regime” was also on the list. Call the government the “regime” rather than the “enemy” as the term of art.

Although a departure of the historical use of code names, it was not new that you would give the operation a code name that would be part of the marketing. The United States had used names like Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

“Operation Iraqi Freedom” Assessment

- **Code name for the operation transformed into a part of the strategic influence.**
 - **OVERLORD:** During World War II, the codes names were for the purpose of security.
 - **DESERT STORM, DESERT FOX:** Code names continued to be for the purposes of security. They were made two words so the first word could designate the commander running the operation. **DESERT = Central Command.**
- **Because of the repetition and the visual quality added by the television networks, this became an effective memory producing technique in Gulf II.**

There were some dimensions of the marketing that were a little strange. Eisenhower’s military objective was to “enter the continent of Europe and destroy the

German Army.”

U.S. Objectives as Strategic Influence

- End the regime of Saddam Hussein...
- Identify, isolate and eventually eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
- Search for, capture, drive out terrorists who have found safe harbor in Iraq.
- Collect such intelligence as we can find related to terrorist networks in Iraq and beyond.
- Collect such intelligence as we can find related to the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction activity...
- End sanctions and to immediately deliver humanitarian relief, food and medicine...
- Secure Iraq's oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people...
- Help the Iraqi people create the conditions for a rapid transition to a representative self-government ...

The Secretary of Defense said these were the objectives given to Central Command. They were obviously meant for the press. As far as I am aware, this is the first time a military commander was given objectives that were about justifying the war.

From the very beginning it was called an “ambush” from the podia. That lingered even in articles that questioned the official version of the events. “What really happened in the ambush of the 507th?” If you drive a convoy into enemy lines, turn around and drive back, it’s not an ambush.


Private Jessica Lynch

- From the beginning, it was called an “ambush.”
- **Am·bush (n)**
 - 1. an unexpected attack from a concealed position
 - 2. a concealment before a surprise attack
 - 3. one or more people concealed in order to make a surprise attack
 - 4. a hiding place used in an ambush
- **Assessment: It’s not an ambush when you drive a convoy into enemy lines. Terrorists would do something like an ambush.**

Military officers who are very careful about how they talk about operations would normally not be sloppy about describing this kind of event. This un-military kind of talk is one of the reasons I began doing this research. They just didn’t cherish the truth.

In my mind, the most serious transformation of language was the direction from Washington to call the Iraqi irregular troops “terrorist death squads.” One source told me this came in a letter from Rumsfeld. I’ve read in another place it was from the White

House.



After the 25th of March, the presenters changed the name.

Saddam Fedayeen : Assessment

- Naming the irregulars seems to have been part of the strategic influence campaign:
 - Calling them terrorists connected them with one of the major themes of Gulf II.
 - Iraq = terrorists = 9/11 = grave threat in the future.
- The structure of the argument and repetition are an effective implementation of the theory of creating memory in a population.
- Obviously, this theme was successful by US opinion polls; majority of citizens believe Iraq was connected to 9/11.

This was part of the “big lie” to tie Iraq to 9/11. As the polls have shown, it has been very effective. It continues to be effective, but what would be wrong with truth?

More Terrorist Theme

- **March 22, Franks, CENTCOM Briefing, “I can’t really provide you a lot of detail. I can tell you that from time to time, in Iraq, we will come across what we believe to be terrorist-associated activity or people, and when we do so, we will strike them, and then we will exploit the site subsequent to the strike. I can tell you that in fact we did strike last evening a terrorist complex...”**
- **March 24 – Wolfowitz, BBC World Service, “We’ve just taken some very decisive action against that pocket of al Qaeda terrorists in Kramal.”**
- **March 25th – Brooks, CENTCOM Briefing, “The practices that have been conducted by these paramilitaries and by these others who are out there, sometimes in uniform, sometimes not in uniform, are more akin to the behaviors of global terrorists than they are to a nation. And that certainly is in our mind at this time.”**
- **Assessment: Obvious why an Associated Press poll conducted shortly after Gulf II was declared ended, 53 percent of the nation pin the 9/11 attacks on Saddam.**

The “terrorist” connection took many other forms, many forms but the truth. I don’t see evidence they cherished the truth.

“The first image will define the conflict.” Much of the effort was about image. It might be called the marketing event that never happened. It was to be a big show when Basrah fell. Sources in the BBC tell me the reason the US 15th MEU was assigned to this part of the battlefield was so an American unit could lead the way into the city. Although the reason for the assignment might not be true, it is almost as important point that they believed that of the Americans.

Operation TELIC Production Event

- **“The first image of the war will define the conflict...” USMC spokesman.**
- **15 Marine Expeditionary Unit given task of attacking Umm Qasr and Basrah over the objections of the UK because US wanted to have their forces lead the victory into Basrah. (My sources in the UK)**
- **Military officials said:**
 - **Marines were to carry packets of food to pass out to children.**
 - **Medics were to provide care as the forces moved as the occupation forces rolled in.**
 - **Journalists were to be bused to the city.**
 - **Television crews were to be flown into the city.**
- **Battle of Basrah took over two weeks, and the media event did not take place.**

The US and the UK had a difference over the code name to give the conflict. The Brits chose to call it Operation TELIC, more consistent with the traditional methodology for naming combat operations.

It was about image, so much effort and money on image.

When the pattern becomes clear some of the stories have new clarity.

Ansar al-Salam

- **Said to be Al Qaeda terrorists**
 - Splinter Kurdish group who found bin Laden's efforts heroic.
 - Was formed "shortly after 9/11" although probably December 2001.
- **Said to be controlled by Saddam Hussein because there were reports of two Republican Guard officers since in the vicinity.**
- **Said to be producing ricin.**
 - Reports after the attack on the facility suggested important documents.
 - The "poison factory" lacked sophistication and was housed in a small cinderblock building bearing brown granules and ammonia-like scents. Tests by U.S. laboratories revealed traces of chemicals including hydrogen cyanide and potassium cyanide, substances usually used to kill rodents. Jeffrey Fleishman, *LA Times*, September 3, 2003

Secretary of State Powell showed a picture in his presentation to the UN Security Council. The title was "Terrorist Poison and Explosives Factory."

From the beginning, the implication that since the group was formed shortly after 9/11 it was tied to bin Laden. Because a single source reported Republican Guard officers in the area, it was tied to Saddam Hussein.

They did find rat poison in one of the buildings. Was it bad intelligence, or did they blur the line between a single source of information and the story they wanted to tell?

Salman Pak

- **"Former Iraqi military officers have described a highly secret terrorist training facility in Iraq known as Salman Pak, where both Iraqis and non-Iraqi Arabs receive training on hijacking planes and trains, planting explosives in cities, sabotage, and assassinations." White House White Paper, *Decade of Deception*, September 12, 2002**

The White House told us there was a terrorist training facility for non-Iraqi Arabs. This facility became a major part of the strategic influence, market effort. Why didn't we find compelling evidence?

Why couldn't we have been told the truth about the power grid?

Attacking the Iraqi Power Grid

- April 3, 2003 - Release Number: 03-04-38
BAGHDAD ELECTRICAL SYSTEM NOT TARGETED BY COALITION - CAMP AS SAYLIYAH, Qatar--News reports indicate that electrical power is out in Baghdad. Coalition forces have not targeted Baghdad's electrical system.
- "We did not have the power grid as a target. That was not us." - DOD News Briefing, April 4, Tori Clarke
- Facts:
 - US targeted portions of the power grid in the North during a special operations attack on the dam at Hadithah on April 1st or 2nd.
 - Power grid was attacked two or three times south of Baghdad along Highway 6; this included a Tomahawk strike using carbon fibers which would have required approval in Washington. (Human Rights Watch)

It was announced several times during the war that the United States had not struck the electrical power grid. This was not true.

Because one of the strikes was with carbon fiber, the targeting would have been approved in Washington. Where was truth from this podium?

The dirty bomb question surfaced a number of times during the marketing of the war. The Iraqi National Congress arranged for an interview of someone who said Iraq was working on a radiation weapon. In June 2002, Khidhir Hamza, an individual often quoted by the White House even by the President himself, implied Iraq was going to train terrorists to use a radiation weapon. In a very subtle technique "officials" did background interviews in which they said radiation weapons were one of the things that kept them awake at night. If it were not part of the pattern, you would almost have to admire this background technique as a way to reinforce a story.

Dirty Bombs


- Iraqi National Congress arranged interview with a defector.
 - "The defector describes a meeting held in Tanzania in 1994, in which he and other Iraqis met five eastern Europeans...cash was exchanged for the contents of a heavy trunk." David Rose, *Vanity Fair*, April 2002.
 - The implication was that this is material that could be used for a dirty bomb.
- "This environment is ideal for countries like Iraq to train and support a terrorist operation using radiation weapons..." Khidhir Hamza, *Wall Street Journal*, June 12, 2002.
- Program terminated, Iraq Report to the UN, December 9
- "A few officials speaking on background, have engaged in what-could-go-wrong conversations, saying they are kept awake at night by the prospect of a dirty bomb." David Sanger, *International Herald Tribune*, February 28th.

As in this case, some of the most extreme support for the message often came from individuals and groups with close connections to the White House or the Pentagon. This is one example.

The case of Commander Speicher is particularly painful when I describe it to military friends. He was a naval aviator shot down early in the first Gulf War. There was some question about his status right after that war, but the evidence suggests his case was used to generate support and to market this war. A reporter told me that Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz had a list of 10 reasons for going to war. The Speicher case was on that list.


Its story came to the surface with a single defector report. Then, in a pattern typical of created stories, the *Washington Times* reported that US "Intelligence Agencies" had information that he was being held captive. The story was allowed to develop because of answers to questions by Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld's answer was particularly disturbing. When he was told in a question that Iraq had denied they were holding Speicher as a prisoner, he responded by saying, "I don't believe much the regime puts out." That answer was too clever not to have been formulated to leave the impression that he was alive. Why doesn't he cherish truth? Why didn't he consider what he was doing to Speicher's family?

Lt. Commander Scott Speicher




The President raised the case in his presentation to the UN. Then, early in the marketing campaign, the Navy changed his status from "missing in action" to "captured." ABC News has reported that Navy officials say they were pressured to make this change. I can't confirm that.

Lt. Commander Scott Speicher



In January 2003, “intelligence officials” continue to leak information that Speicher was alive and being held captive. In April, almost as if to keep the story alive, it was reported that his initials had been found on the wall of a cell. This was a very strange leak. Military POW recovery personnel are very careful about releasing information that would cause false hope in families.

Lt. Commander Scott Speicher




The facts are that no trace has been found of him. DNA of hair fibers in the cell where the initials were found did not match.

Again, what becomes important is the pattern. It does not seem as if we were getting truth from the podia.

There were the chemical cluster bombs:

Chemical Cluster Bombs ***Quick Response***



The chemical cluster bomb story certainly didn't linger. It was around only a couple days. It was part of the attack on the second report from Hans Blix. On March 10, there were releases and statements by Administration officials that the UNMOVIC report did not cover the Iraqi chemical cluster bomb program.

Chemical Cluster Bombs ***Complex Way of Delivering Chemicals***

- **There is no evidence to conclude that Iraq has a warhead with chemical submunitions. No information on testing has been obtained, and experimentation with bursts at relatively high release points has not been seen. OSD, Post 1991 Report on Patriot Use During Gulf I**
- **Assessment: This is a technologically very difficult to achieve; much better ways of delivering chemical or biological weapons.**

OSD had discounted Iraq developing what would be a very complex weapons system during the first Gulf War.