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To build up an anti-terrorism alliance, the administration and Congress hastily paid up U.S. debts to the United Nations and made important concessions to Pakistan, Russia and Central Asian republics. The United States needed bases in Central Asia and military concessions elsewhere. Endorsements from NATO and the Security Council gave legitimacy to U.S. actions. However, there was no intention in Washington to admit others to U.S. war councils, or to modify decisions according to what the Security Council, or anyone else, thought about the war on terrorism. There is much to be said for unilateral action. It is efficient, time-saving and usually effective. After the Kosovo experience, when Washington had to dicker over tactics and operational decisions with NATO allies, the Pentagon said, "Never again." In Afghanistan, Washington has run the whole show. Even the faithful British complain that their SAS soldiers have been expected to ask no questions, disregard their own command structure and do what less experienced American commanders tell them to do. The crisis has been seen by what can be called the War Party in Washington - or the "benevolent hegemony" crowd - as a welcome boost to its own ambitions, which are to make a fundamental change in the world balance that will leave the United States in charge, its "rogue nation" enemies defeated and the Russians, Chinese and Europeans permanently reduced to secondary roles. The Russian reaction has been the most important. Until this week's ABM Treaty decision, it could have been argued that Russia, with Israel, benefited most from the Sept. 11 attacks. Vladimir Putin was elected president of Russia to defend a major world role for his country. Two options existed for him. The first, which for a time he explored, was to try to re-establish the Cold War's bilateral conflict between the United States and a coalition of rivals, including China, India and other Third World countries. The rallying call would be pluralism and balance. The other, which Russia actually adopted, was to join the American-led Western coalition to advance Russian interests. Thus Mr. Putin endorsed America's reaction to the Sept. 11 attacks, saying that Russia also had an Islamic terrorism problem, in Chechnya, as well as other outbreaks of nationalism in the Caucasus. A strategic partnership with the United States to deal with terrorism everywhere, he suggested, would be welcome. Both sides indicated that a way could be found to finesse the ABM Treaty problem. That problem, in any case, need not be a problem. As Philip Coyle and John Rhinelander, former U.S. defense officials, wrote in the autumn issue of the New York quarterly World Policy Journal, "While testing and deployment options can be designed to violate the ABM accord, doing so is not necessary to advance the development of missile defense-related technologies. For the moment, development of missile defense hardware and software does not require - and may actually be harmed by - the kind of emergency crash program" promoted by the administration. Mr. Bush's denunciation of the ABM Treaty could be interpreted as an act of hubris, a defiance of Russia and the rest of the international community. The triumph of military operations in Afghanistan and the collapse of the Taliban have given an enormous boost to Washington's sense of supremacy. The supremacy is real, but military-based. It carries political power, but also a grave danger of acting as if no other kind of power counts. Squandering, unnecessarily, the advantages of the new relationship with Russia is not a good sign. Copyright © 2001 the International Herald Tribune ###
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